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Drug-trafficking has historically funded armed rebellions in Mali and fuelled inter-ethnic and inter-
clan conflicts over control of drug-trafficking routes in Northern communities. The proceeds of drug-
trafficking have also financed the local governance of Northern communities in Mali in the absence of 
effective state governance. Because of community reliance on organized crime for local governance 
services, the efforts of the 2015 Bamako national peace process to stamp out organized crime using 
confrontational2  law enforcement strategies without providing alternative sources of local governance 
have fuelled Northern grievances against the state.  
  
 
Transformative approaches to peace mediation conducted at the local level – which use inclusive 
community-based dialogue and socio-economic development strategies to turn criminal governance 
into legitimate governance gradually – are required to effectively displace organized crime in Northern 
communities in the long-term. The security classifications relied upon by peace mediators to manage 
organized crime through national and local peace processes have limited capacity to inform 
transformative mediation because they remove organized crime from its socio-political context. This 
brief argues that sociological concepts and empirical analysis, which places organized crime in its social 
context and frames organized crime as a problem of local governance, can inform inclusive, 
transformative local mediation focused on organized crime. 
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 Transformative local level mediation facilitated by third party non-state mediators without an 
international security agenda is required to develop long-term solutions to crime-related 
conflicts in Mali. 
 
 Mediators should adopt a context-driven approach to conflict analysis to include a diverse 
range of local stakeholders affected by organized criminal governance, rather than assume that 
armed groups or customary leaders are the legitimate representatives of Northern 
communities3.  
 
 Sociological empirical analysis and conceptual frameworks, which understand organized crime 
in its local context as a community response to poor state governance, can inform 
transformative mediation based on local governance issues and the broad-based inclusion of 
heterogeneity of local actors. 
 
 The policy of „confrontation‟ or „accommodation‟ of drug-trafficking communities, currently 
favoured in national and local peace negotiations respectively, only promotes sustained 
militarization of drug routes without providing a long-term governance-based solution to the 
conflict.
Key Points 
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Introduction 
 
n 2012, a Tuareg rebellion erupted in 
Northern Mali for the fourth time since 
Mali gained independence in 1960. The 
2012 rebellion and its aftermath differed from 
those that came before it in three ways that 
affected the management of organized crime 
during the 2015 peace process. Firstly, the 
Tuareg rebel movements joined forces with the 
Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Dine to launch 
attacks against the government in the South, 
taking control of parts of North and Central 
Mali. They were eventually militarily 
overpowered and displaced by three Islamist 
groups: Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Mahgreb (AQIM), and its offshoot the 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO). The Malian government requested 
the French military assistance to combat the 
Islamist groups, and a UN mission was 
deployed to Mali to carry out security tasks 
related to counter-terrorism and counter-
narcotics. International security analysis focused 
on local elite drug-traffickers as a source of 
funding for Islamist groups in Mali. As a result 
of the strong international security presence, the 
2015 Bamako peace process relied heavily on 
security classifications of armed groups, 
including the security-based distinction between 
political and criminal actors.4   
 
Secondly, Northern communities have gradually 
lost the traditional clan-based leaders who 
resolved intercommunity tensions over drug-
trafficking routes and rents in the North. The 
new generation of customary leaders is too close 
to armed groups to play a conciliatory role in the 
inter-clan disputes in the North. Older 
customary leaders are also increasingly 
challenged by the youth in their communities, 
who join armed groups to bolster their 
authority 5  .Rivalries between the various 
Northern communities – Tuareg, Arab, Songhoi, 
Peulh and other ethnic groups – as well as clans 
within each of these groups – have been central 
to the cyclical conflicts of Northern Mali.  
Without local mediation to pacify these rivalries, 
the Northern political coalitions that united to 
negotiate the Bamako agreement began to 
fragment during the negotiation phase into clan-
based groups, contributing to the increasing 
„regionalization‟ and „clanization‟ 6   of the 
conflict in Northern Mali. 
 
Thirdly, local communities have also become 
dependent on armed groups to perform local 
government functions such as service delivery, 
welfare, security and justice provision. Given the 
strong connection between armed groups, drug-
trafficking and local governance provision in the 
North, the cycle of violence connected to drug-
trafficking routes is most effectively addressed 
by developing alternative sources of local 
governance for Northern communities7. This can 
be achieved through the revitalization of 
transformative local mediation in the North 
focused on inclusive dialogue, reconciliation and 
socio-economic development. 
 
This brief argues that international security 
analytical frameworks have limited capacity to 
inform transformative approaches to organized 
crime and local governance because the crime-
politics distinction 8  removes organized crime 
from its local context. It argues that sociological 
concepts and empirical analysis provide the 
foundation for mediation to transform local 
governance structures. The key difference 
between security-based and sociological 
approaches is that sociologists situate organized 
crime within local community power structures 
and understands the problem of organized 
crime not as an external security threat but as an 
issue of local governance. Placing organized 
crime in its social and political context can 
facilitate the identification and inclusion of 
customary leaders, youth and women who have 
a strong interest in the quality of local 
governance. By framing organized crime as a 
governance issue, it can inform a negotiating 
agenda that prioritises local development. 
I 
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Peace from Above 
 
The deep connections between drug-trafficking, 
local governance and the funding of Northern 
rebellion were ignored during the 2015 Bamako 
peace process. Due to the strong international 
security influence on the Bamako process, 
French and Algerian mediators relied on a strict 
but artificial international security-based 
distinction between „compliant‟ political rebels 
who were invited to participate in the peace 
process and „non-compliant‟ criminal actors who 
were made the targets of state and international 
security action. Criminal activity was also 
excluded from the political negotiating agenda. 
The conceptual distinction between the socio-
political and criminal realms proved to be of 
little practical value in the Malian context given 
the „hidden‟ involvement of „compliant‟ or 
„political‟ actors in drug-trafficking activities. 
 
It was widely acknowledged during the 
implementation phase of the Bamako agreement 
that the signatories of the Bamako agreement – 
made up of two coalitions of over 15 Northern 
armed groups - harboured deep ethnic and 
community-based rivalries over access to drug-
trafficking routes. Northern local politics 
regarding drug-trafficking resulted in the 
fragmentation of the negotiating coalitions and 
the renewed outbreak of fighting in the North 
immediately after the agreement was signed.  
 
The treatment of criminal actors as a security 
threat external to politics and society led to an 
inadequate confrontational policy response to 
drug-trafficking focused on technical state 
security reform. The priority agenda items of the 
Bamako process were state security reform and 
national level political power-sharing. Poor state 
and local governance, which prompts the 
emergence of organized crime and armed 
groups as a source of alternative governance, 
were a low negotiating priority and the 
economic development provisions of the 
agreement are yet to be implemented. 
 
 
 
The Bamako agreement bolstered state and 
international counter-narcotics law enforcement 
capacity to confront drug-trafficking 
communities, which only served to exacerbate 
grievances regarding state military oppression 
of the North. The security-oriented approach 
also contributed to further militarization of 
drug-trafficking routes as armed groups 
emerged to protect supply routes from state 
forces. As local drug-traffickers fulfil state 
governance functions, international labels of 
criminality also lacked local legitimacy and 
alienated local communities and local actors 
from the peace process. The local orders of the 
North can be unpredictable and brutal but are 
viewed by many in Northern Malian as 
preferable to the governance of a corrupt, 
abusive and neglectful state. 
 
 
Peace from Below 
 
The implementation of the Bamako agreement 
has been hindered by the lack of cohesive and 
consistent local dispute resolution processes 
regarding organized crimes that have 
traditionally supported national peace processes 
in Mali. Local mediations were run by local 
political elites steeped in knowledge of how 
drug-trafficking informed local governance and 
local politics. The 1995 Bourem process, which 
was credited with saving the 1995 national peace 
accord, was initiated and pushed forward by 
village chiefs and civilians who understood the 
destructive impact of the militarization of drug-
trafficking routes on local governance. The 
increasing connection between armed groups, 
drug-trafficking and the provision of local 
governance has reduced the influence of 
customary chiefs and other local community 
members. As a result, Northern communities 
lack the leadership required to pursue a peaceful 
resolution of drug-trafficking disputes.  
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The third party non-state mediators have 
attempted to fill the void in local dispute 
resolution capacity by facilitating local level 
mediation that addresses the drug-trafficking 
issues left out of the international peace process. 
The Anefis processes (27 September – 14 October 
2015, and October 2017) sought to address 
„important questions concerning the North‟s 
politico-military elite…including issues of 
trafficking, power-sharing and inter-communal 
rivalries‟. The first community-led process 
resulted in a „roadmap comprising a series of 
measures, including the cessation of hostilities, 
joint initiatives for inter-communal and intra-
communal reconciliation, the exchange of 
prisoners, the establishment of interim local 
administrations and the free movement of 
people and goods‟ 9 . The second process 
included influential figures involved in 
trafficking. They focused on keeping routes for 
drug-trafficking open to diminish armed 
competition and theft along the drug-trafficking 
route in the North. 
 
Critics of the Anefis processes argue its efforts to 
accommodate organized crime has only 
produced another layer of exclusive elite pacts 
between armed groups with questionable local 
legitimacy, at the expense of broad-based 
inclusion of the local leaders, youth and women 
who have a stake in the resolution of drug-
trafficking disputes 10. By ignoring the broader 
context of local governance, internationally-led 
efforts to revitalise local mediation processes 
have merely transferred the apolitical security 
analytical lens to the local level, producing a 
technical and transactional peace focused on the 
regulation of drug-trafficking routes. 
 
Stamping out drug-trafficking through law 
enforcement interdiction or quelling crime-
related violence through the regulation of drug-
trafficking routes are only short-term solutions 
to a problem that is entrenched in the 
governance of local communities in Northern 
Mali. Without the development of local 
governance, communities will continue to 
support and rely on armed groups, funded by 
criminal activity, to provide basic services. The 
agendas and stakeholder engagement strategies 
of local mediation must evolve from the mere 
accommodation of armed groups to support the 
transformation of local governance in Northern 
communities. 
 
A Sociological Approach: From Security 
to Local Governance 
 
ecurity-based concepts have limited to 
capacity to support transformative 
mediation to organized crime because 
they remove criminal actors and criminal 
activity from the local socio-political context that 
is the subject of transformative approaches. 
Sociological methodologies, which analyse 
problems such as organized crime as a function 
of their social context, offer a conceptual and 
empirical foundation for inclusive, context-
driven local mediation on organized crime.    
 
Sociologies of organized crime11 treat organized 
crime not as a security issue external to conflict 
societies but as an issue of local governance that 
is deeply entwined with the socio-political 
power structures of local communities. 
Sociological research reveals that the motives for 
locally-based organized crime is not merely 
economic, but also institutional, in that 
organized crime groups can emerge to provide 
security, justice and economic welfare for 
communities that are socially and economically 
abandoned by the state. According to his view, 
organized crime is not merely a transnational 
security threat but can be a community-based 
solution to an absence of state governance. 
Given the focus on organized crime as 
governance, sociologies of organized crime 
provide an analytical frame to inform a 
transformative negotiating agenda based on the 
development of local governance.  
 
S 
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The „local‟ is often treated by analysts and peace 
mediators as an undifferentiated field of 
uniform actors and interests, leading to the 
assumption that the armed groups of Northern 
Mali are the legitimate representatives of 
Northern communities12. Adopting an empirical 
sociological analysis of the heterogeneity of 
actors in a local community allows mediators to 
identify a diverse range of armed and non-
armed stakeholders who have an interest in or 
are affected by organized crime. Sociological 
analysis exposes unequal local power structures 
and grievances along class, gender and inter-
generational lines that must be addressed if local 
governance is to improve. In Northern Malian 
communities, youth and the lower classes are 
joining armed groups in increasing numbers to 
challenge the traditional customary and 
religious authorities they view as unfair or 
corrupt 13 . Sociological approaches can reveal 
these inter-generational tensions, dispel the view 
that non-armed customary leaders can 
legitimately speak for their entire community 
and promote the inclusion of youth in dialogue. 
 
A sociological analysis of organized crime could 
facilitate the inclusion of the excluded local non-
armed leaders of the Bamako process. The social 
legitimacy of Northern local leaders stems from 
measured control of deep, socially-embedded 
historical drug trafficking networks. These 
leaders have converted financial profits from 
drug-trafficking into social capital with 
communities – paying for mosques and buying 
herds of cattle 14 . Although their authority is 
increasingly challenged by armed actors and 
younger members of their communities, they 
still play a legitimate role in local governance.   
 
Policy Recommendations and 
Conclusion 
 
The sociological approach of organized crime as 
local governance paves the way for a more 
inclusive peace process design. It captures the 
heterogeneity and complexity of armed and 
non-armed local actors and interests connected 
to organized crime in a local community. It 
allows third-party mediators to move beyond 
the narrow selection of armed actors to identify 
and include customary, generational, gender 
and class-based representatives who have an 
interest in the management of organized crime 
from the perspective of local governance and 
development.   
 
A series of transformative local level mediations 
based on sociological conflict analysis is the 
most effective policy response to organized 
criminal violence in settings similar to the Mali 
case study, where violence is fragmented and 
localised, a strong international security agenda 
can overshadow local priorities in national peace 
processes, and where organized crime plays a 
pivotal role in local governance. Mediation at 
the local level can shift attention away from 
international security issues and methods of 
conflict analysis towards context-driven 
sociological conflict analysis and local priorities 
regarding the management of organized 
criminal governance. Local mediation teams can 
target localised conflicts more effectively and 
can also be deployed for longer time frames than 
national peace processes, which are often 
conducted under significant time pressures. 
 
The introduction of new professional actors 
should support new sociological approaches to 
mediation and conflict analysis into the peace 
process. The appointment of a third-party non-
state mediator, who does not have ties to 
international security agendas, is important to 
open the peace process up to new analytical 
frameworks, actors and methods of conflict 
analysis. Sociologists should be included in 
mediation teams to support new modes of 
stakeholder engagement and agenda setting.  
 
Although local mediation is an effective conflict 
resolution tool in the Malian context, local 
governance cannot be developed without the 
funding, policy support and inclusion of state 
actors in the process. Mechanisms need to be put 
in place to connect local mediation processes to 
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the national level and to support dialogue 
between state and local actors. Experts in 
sociology could be a useful link between local 
mediation on organized crime and national 
peace processes by providing missing 
information on local power structures and 
interests at both levels. 
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